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A Tyrannosaurus-Rex Aptly Named “Sue”:
Using a Disputed Dinosaur to Teach Contract Defenses
Miriam A. Cherry*
I.

INTRODUCTION

In August 1990, commercial fossil hunters from the Black Hills Geologic Institute
(“Black Hills”) discovered the remains of an almost-complete Tyrannosaurus Rex
skeleton located in the badlands of South Dakota.1 Named “Sue” after her discoverer,2
the fossil immediately became the subject of controversy. Although many of the facts
were disputed, the collectors gave the purported owner of the land, a Native American
rancher named Maurice Williams, a check for $5,000, which he cashed, and the
collectors excavated Sue.3 The fair market value of a T-Rex skeleton with that degree of
completeness was over eight million dollars.4
Once the discovery began to garner publicity, Williams began a fierce court battle
to rescind the contract with Black Hills, claiming that the $5,000 was merely a payment

*
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1

See Larry McShane, Museum Pays $8.4 Million for T-Rex: 65-Million-Year-Old Fossil
to Go on Display in Chicago in 2000, WASH. POST, Oct. 5, 1997, at A10, available at
1997 WL 14705613; Phillip Zonkel, Sue-per Sized Awesome T. Rex Fossil Gets
Presented in its Full Glory at Natural History Museum, L.A. DAILY NEWS, Nov. 29, 2000
at L6, available at 2000 WL 31047919 (describing Sue’s discovery and the rareness of
finding a 90% complete Tyrannosaurus Rex).
2

Sue Hendrickson, a sometime fossil collector and treasurer hunter, spotted the fossils
embedded in a cliff. Hendrickson has authored a children’s book about her career and the
discovery of the dinosaur. SUE HENDRICKSON & KIMBERLY WEINBERGER, HUNT FOR THE
PAST: MY LIFE AS AN EXPLORER (2001).
3

CURSE OF T. REX (Nova original television broadcast, Feb. 25, 1997). In October of
1997, Sotheby’s auctioned Sue off. In the face of intense bidding, the Chicago field
museum purchased Sue for $8,362,500. See McShane, supra note 1, at A10.

4

McShane, supra note 1, at A10.
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to inspect the property for potential fossils.5 And he was not the only one with a bone to
pick. At one point, the parties claiming ownership of Sue included Black Hills, Williams,
the Cheyenne River Sioux tribe (Williams’ land was within the boundaries of their
reservation), and the federal government (the government had held the land in trust for
Williams so it was not subject to tax forfeiture).6
Ultimately, the district court,7 and then the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals,8
ruled against the Black Hills. The structure of the trust required government permission
in order to sell land. Holding that Sue’s bones were part of the “land,” the Eighth Circuit
determined that Sue could only be sold if government permission had been granted, and,
as Black Hills had never requested permission, it had no claim to the fossil.9 The Eighth
Circuit concluded that the federal government held the fossil in trust for Williams.10 In
addition to the pages of the federal reporter and in the press, Sue’s story has also been

5

Black Hills Inst. of Geological Research v. Dept. of Justice, 812 F. Supp. 1015, 1017
(D.S.D. 1993) (“On August 27, 1990, [Black Hills] issued a check to Maurice Williams
for $5,000, alleging that it was ‘for title to the fossil and the right to excavate the fossil
from his land.’”), aff’d in part, rev’d in part sub nom. Black Hills Inst. of Geological
Research v. S.D. Sch. of Mines & Tech., 12 F.3d 737 (8th Cir. 1993).

6

The government also mounted a criminal prosecution of the fossil hunters for unrelated
instances of the theft of fossils from federal land. See United States v. Larson, 110 F.3d
620 (8th Cir. 1997). Although the possibility of criminal sanctions for taking fossils from
federal or tribal lands is also an interesting subject, the criminal law dimensions are
beyond the scope of this article. For the Black Hills’ viewpoint on the criminal charges,
see Patrick K. Duffy & Lois A. Lofgren, Jurassic Farce: A Critical Analysis of the
Government’s Seizure of “Sue [TM],” A Sixty-Five-Million-Year-Old Tyrannosaurus Rex
Fossil, 39 S.D. L. REV. 478 (1994). While useful, the article is also extremely partisan, as
Duffy was Larson’s attorney in the criminal trial. The Black Hills Institute later
discovered another T-Rex skeleton that they named “Duffy” in gratitude for their
lawyer’s services.
7

Black Hills, 812 F. Supp. at 1022.

8

Black Hills Inst. of Geological Research v. S.D. Sch. of Mines & Tech., 12 F.3d 737,
739 (8th Cir. 1993).

9

Id. at 743-44.

10

Id.
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told in two books,11 one of which, Rex Appeal, was written by fossil hunter and Black
Hills founder Peter Larson.12
An understanding of contract law and contract defenses is essential to
understanding and analyzing the question of Sue’s ownership.13 Sue’s case involves the
high-stakes world of fossil hunting and collecting, a subject matter that students find
appealing. Besides piquing student interest, Sue’s case also allows for a far-ranging
discussion of many contract defenses. When discussing the contract between Maurice
Williams and the Black Hills Institute, students begin formulating arguments based on
the doctrines of unilateral mistake, unequal bargaining power, capacity,
unconscionability, and the failure of a condition.
I provide this description of the teaching module I use for contract defenses as one
possible alternative to the Socratic method. As described in the final portion of this
Article, the Socratic method has come under attack in recent years.14 In response to such
criticisms, the lesson that I describe provides a constructive alternative to the Socratic
method, based on the theory of problem-based learning and the appropriate incorporation
of technology in the classroom. However, unlike other problem-based learning
approaches, this particular lesson can be adopted without having to change the entire
structure of an already-existing course, and does not mean the utter extinction of a
traditional casebook.15 Rather, the exercise supplements the typical coverage of contract
defenses in the major casebooks.
11

The first book, written by Steve Fiffer, a former journalist and attorney, is a wellwritten account that provides a multi-faceted and balanced view of the case, including the
point of view of many of the participants. STEVE FIFFER, TYRANNOSAURUS SUE: THE
EXTRAORDINARY SAGA OF THE LARGEST, MOST FOUGHT OVER T.REX EVER FOUND
(2000).
12

The second book, written by fossil-hunter Peter Larson and his ex-wife, former
journalist Kristin Donnan, is, unsurprisingly, a partisan re-telling of the case from
Larson’s perspective. PETER L. LARSON & KRISTIN DONNAN, REX APPEAL: THE
AMAZING STORY OF SUE, THE DINOSAUR THAT CHANGED SCIENCE, THE LAW, AND MY
LIFE (2002).
13

Property law and Native American law are vital to analyzing Sue’s ownership, and it
was on these grounds that the actual case was decided. A recent casenote suggests that
Sue’s case could be used to teach property law. See Dana G. Jim, Great Property Case:
Johnson v. M’Intosh and the South Dakota Fossil Cases, 46 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 791 (2002).
Therefore, in this Article I concentrate solely on the contracts questions that Sue’s case
raises and how law professors can use Sue’s case to teach contracts defenses.
14

See Part IV infra.

15

See Douglas L. Leslie, Approaches to Teaching Contracts: How Not to Teach
Contracts, and any Other Course: Powerpoint, Laptops, and the Casefile Method, 44 ST.
LOUIS. U.L.J. 1289 (2000) (advocating adoption of the author’s casefiles in lieu of
traditional casebook).
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II.

TEACHING CONTRACT DEFENSES: REWARDS AND CHALLENGES

Teaching contract defenses is one of the more difficult parts of the basic contracts
course. During the first portion of the course,16 I spend a great deal of time on basic
concepts – the rules of offer and acceptance, consideration, and promissory estoppel – as
well as helping students become familiar with basic legal skills, such as how to discern
the holding of a case from dicta; how to master the standard arguments about bright line
rules versus legal standards; and how to discern the various sources of contract law.
Despite the oddity and strange amusement value in the cases of dissolute smoking and
drinking nephews,17 sick children at sea who run up medical bills,18 and loyal employees
who dive off platforms to save their bosses,19 the first part of the course must necessarily
focus on teaching basic legal skills.
During the next portion of the course, the focus is on the interpretation of
contracts, issues of parole evidence, and the intent of the parties as contrasted with legal
background norms. At this point, the students begin to realize that many of the legal
“rules” they are learning, such as parole evidence, are actually things that I like to
describe as “rules with a hole in the middle of them,” capable of being categorized and
16

My first-year contracts class at Cumberland Law School, Samford University, is a
year-long course. Currently I employ the casebook compiled by Randy Barnett, as it
includes almost all of the “casebook classics” that are studied widely at law schools
around the country. RANDY E. BARNETT, CONTRACTS: CASES AND DOCTRINE (3d ed.
2003). Choosing a contracts casebook is a somewhat daunting task for a new law
professor. For several reviews of contracts casebooks, see Kellye Y. Testy, Intention in
Tension, 20 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 319 (1997) (reviewing Barnett casebook); Michael B.
Kelly, Reflections on Barnett’s Contracts, Cases and Doctrine, 20 SEATTLE U. L. REV.
343 (1997) (same); Geoffrey R. Watson, A Casebook for All Seasons?, 20 SEATTLE U. L.
REV. 277 (1997) (reviewing Alan Farnsworth’s casebook); Lenora Ledwon, Storytelling
and Contracts, 13 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 117 (2001) (reviewing Kastely, Hom and
Post’s casebook, Contracting Law). One influential article by Mary Jo Frug has had an
impact on the way casebooks are structured and the way that I teach my contracts class.
See Mary Jo Frug, Re-reading Contracts: A Feminist Analysis of a Contracts Casebook,
34 AM. U. L. REV. 1065 (1985).
17

Hamer v. Sidway, 27 N.E. 256 (N.Y. 1891) (holding that uncle’s promise to nephew to
reward him if he abstained from drinking and smoking was supported by consideration).
18

Mills v. Wyman, 20 Mass. 207 (1825) (holding that father was not liable for
reimbursing good Samaritan for grown son’s medical care under contract theory).

19

Webb v. McGowin, 168 So. 196 (Ala. Ct. App. 1935) (holding that, despite doctrinal
problems with past and moral consideration, employer’s estate was responsible for
periodic payments to employee who earlier had saved employer’s life by diving off upper
floor of mill to stop pine block from falling on employer).
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argued either way.20 By the time we reach promissory estoppel, students begin to realize
that some aspects of law are indeterminate, or are subject to argument, and are not just a
clean list of rules that one may easily memorize. This concept, along with the idea that
the common law might provide one way of resolving an issue, while the Uniform
Commercial Code may provide an entirely different, and indeed, sometimes contrary
approach,21 is one that confuses students until they have had enough time to digest it.
It is only during the third portion of the course, contract defenses, that the firstyear students have cut their teeth enough as legal thinkers so that we can have an
intelligent discussion of the legal issues. But the defenses are often tricky for students to
learn. Far too often students are willing to accept what the contract says at face value and
assume that the analysis is over, just assuming the validity of an ostensible arm’s-length
transaction.22 Beyond teaching my students how to read the contract carefully and
understand what it says, I am also interested in teaching them to anticipate any problems
with the contract that may arise. But beyond forcing a student to question the validity of
the written word, a student must also learn to distinguish between the theoretical basis for
each contract defense, for example, the difference between unconscionabilty and undue
influence. Additionally, students also must learn how to deploy the contract defenses on
behalf of a client.
Despite being “difficult,” I find that contract defenses are one of the more
interesting parts of the course. Although contract law typically involves parties who
20

GRANT GILMORE, THE DEATH OF CONTRACT 60-61 (1974) (describing the doctrines of
consideration and promissory estoppel doctrine as “matter and antimatter” and
“Restatement and anti-restatement”).
21

Compare the common law mirror image rule as articulated in Ardente v. Horan, 366
A.2d 162 (R.I. 1976)(holding that acceptance had to be “mirror image” of offer, or else it
functioned as counter-offer), with U.C.C. § 2-207 (2003) (stating that response adding or
subtracting terms could still function as counteroffer, unless the differences constitute a
“material alteration” of the terms or the offer was conditioned only on that particular set
of terms); compare the common law rule requiring consideration to keep an option open
as in Dickenson v. Dodds, 2 Ch. D. 463 (1876) with U.C.C. § 2-205 (2003) (allowing
merchants to hold options open without consideration so long as there is a signed writing
and the period of time does not exceed three months); compare common law requirement
of additional consideration to make a contract modification binding, as articulated in Ala.
Packers’ Ass’n v. Domenico, 117 F. 99 (9th Cir. 1902) with U.C.C. § 2-209 (2003)
(permitting contract modification without additional consideration); compare the
common law requirement of the duty to mitigate damages under the common law, as
articulated in Rockingham County v. Luten Bridge Co., 35 F.2d 301 (4th Cir. 1929)
(holding that, upon breach, the other party must stop performing duties under the contract
so as not to increase the harm), with U.C.C. § 2-704 (2003) (allowing seller, after breach
of contract, to complete manufacture of good so as not to waste work already in process).
22

An arm’s-length transaction with a T-Rex would be an interesting arrangement, given
their tiny forelimbs.
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voluntarily assume a duty and are responsible for that duty, 23 with the defenses the law
acknowledges that there are some circumstances, either because of a flaw in the assent
process, harshness of the terms, or some other equitable reason, for that voluntary duty
not to be enforced. Often, where there is a question regarding duress, undue influence, or
unconscionability, courts must draw a fine line between insulating individuals from their
own “bad deals” and preventing business practices that are sharper than a T-Rex tooth.
III. TEACHING MODULE: APPLICATION OF CONTRACT DEFENSES
To begin the teaching module, I show the class the video “Curse of T. Rex,” part of
the “Nova” television series that airs on the Public Broadcasting System.24 The video
features the story of Sue’s discovery, and includes interviews with Peter Larson, Maurice
Williams, tribal members, and prominent paleontologists. At approximately fiftyminutes, the video is the ideal length for showing to a class. I showed the video to my
class after we had finished the entire unit on contract defenses.
During the video, you may want to stop the tape to interpose questions. For example,
when the tribal leaders discuss how they have right to the dinosaur, you can stop the tape
to ask the class why they think that might or might not be accurate. At other times, when
Peter Larson is putting forth his theory of ownership, you can likewise pose questions to
the class, and ask the class whether Larson is making statements that are partisan or
otherwise self-interested. Another possibility for stopping the tape is when Maurice
Williams is shown on camera with Larson and the fossil hunters. Larson says that Sue
will stay in South Dakota as part of the Black Hills museum. In response, Williams
states: “Under that you’ll say . . . Pete’ll say stolen from Maurice Williams.”25 After an
awkward moment of silence, both the fossil hunters and Williams begin laughing.26
Rather than show the whole video, you could stop the tape before the video reveals the
outcome of the civil trial over ownership and the criminal charges, which occurs
approximately forty minutes into the video.27
23

The idea that contractual duties are, in a sense, a form of strict liability is an old one,
tracing back to the 1600s. See Paradine v. Jane, 82 Eng. Rep. 897 (1647) (“When the
party by his own contract creates a duty or charge upon himself, he is bound to make it
good, notwithstanding any accident by inevitable necessity, because he might have
provided against it by his contract.”).

24

The video Curse of T. Rex is available for purchase on the PBS website. CURSE OF T.
REX (Nova original television broadcast, Feb. 25, 1997). See www.pbs.org. Alternately,
used copies may be obtained from other sources, including E-bay.
25

CURSE OF T. REX (Nova original television broadcast, Feb. 25, 1997).

26

Id.

27

Of course, the instructor can also assign the students to read the district court opinion
or the Eighth Circuit opinion. Even though I did not assign these cases, many of my
students looked them up on Westlaw simply because they were interested in reading what
the outcome was and how the court would reach a result.
7

Once the class has seen the video, I usually spend another class period on discussion.
I begin the discussion by asking the class to identify the contracts issues that seemed to
be salient in the video. This helps students sharpen their issue-spotting skills.28 Then I
guide the discussion toward the question of whether or not the students think the contract
for the sale of Sue is enforceable. One of the assumptions that I have the class make is
that the $5000 payment is for removal of the dinosaur, not just for an inspection of the
land.29
If the discussion has wandered onto a tangent, the students can be brought back to the
central point about contract defenses simply by asking the class to put themselves in the
position of Maurice Williams’ lawyer. As an attorney for Williams, they have to raise
any and all contract defenses that they possibly can, in order to claim ownership of the
fossil. If, on the other hand, the instructor wants to help the students with learning how to
formulate arguments, the instructor can always ask one group of students to represent
Williams, another to represent Larson, and others to represent the Cheyenne River Sioux
and the federal government.
No matter whether they are arguing the pros and cons of applying a particular
doctrine, I either ask one of the students who is among the “discussion leaders” for the
day (or a volunteer)30 to list the various components are of the doctrine. This serves as a
review of what the students have learned previously and helps frame the rest of the
discussion. If a student raises a defense, such as undue influence, I ask the student to list
the elements of that defense, and then apply it to the case of T-Rex Sue or a hypothetical
I have devised based on the case. I now turn to the contract defenses that my contracts
students this year were able to dig up.
A. Unilateral Mistake
One contract defense the students raise that is potentially applicable to the case is
unilateral mistake. After all, Williams had no idea that he had a dinosaur on his land,
and, even when apprised of the fact that the team had found a T-Rex there, he had no
conception of its value.
The law and economics view of unilateral mistake is that the doctrine is actually a
way of analyzing information asymmetries. One party, with superior information, uses
that information to “get a better deal” or bargain, at the expense of the party without such

28

I ask the students to spot the property law issues as well. After viewing the video,
several students also wanted to discuss the evidence, privilege, and criminal law issues
surrounding the search of the Black Hills’ office for records of fossils that allegedly
originated on federal lands.

29

Obviously, the hypothetical can be changed to make the facts more or less favorable
for Williams.

30

See Part IV infra, discussing the use of the Socratic method.
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information.31 The information can either be gained through careful research, or it may
simply be the result of a “windfall” or otherwise casually acquired.32 Although one party
may have less information than another, society has made the decision to reward
possession of that information; one party may indeed exploit that information to make a
profit.33 On the other hand, there is certain information that people are not allowed to
exploit. As an example of such information, I typically discuss the reasons that insider
trading on the stock market is prohibited.34
However, after some discussion, the class comes to the conclusion that unilateral
mistake is a limited doctrine, and that if a party has entered into a transaction without
doing the research that in hindsight seems to have been essential, that party cannot later
recover.35 If Maurice Williams entered the contract in a state of willful ignorance, that
normally would not be considered a basis for voiding the contract.
B. Unconscionability
Students initially mention unconscionability as a defense because of the price
differential: Williams sold Sue for $5,000, only a tiny fraction of the over eight million
dollars that the fossil was worth. This is the perfect time to discuss the factors that might
make a contract unconscionable. I ask the students to recall that there are really two
components of unconscionability: procedural unconscionability, in which something has
31

MARVIN CHIRELSTEIN, CONCEPTS AND CASE ANALYSIS IN THE LAW OF CONTRACTS
129-130 (2nd ed. 1993) (citing Anthony T. Kronman, Mistake, Disclosure, Information
and the Law of Contracts, 7 J. LEGAL STUD. 1 (1978)).
32

Id.

33

See, e.g., Triana Jones, Inadvertent Disclosure of Privileged Information and the Law
of Mistake: Using Substantive Legal Principles to Guide Ethical Decision Making, 48
EMORY L.J. 1255, 1316-26 (1999); Gregory E. Maggs, Ipse Dixit: The Restatement
(Second) of Contracts and the Modern Development of Contract Law, 66 GEO WASH L.
REV. 508 (1998). Although superior business acumen is rewarded, a defense of unilateral
mistake may be available if the non-mistaken party knew or should have known of the
mistake or if enforcing the contract would be unconscionable. Jones, supra at 1316;
Maggs, supra at 526.
34

See 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5-1 (2003). This year, I gave the students the basic facts of
the Martha Stewart case as an example of insider trading. See, e.g., Deborah Solomon,
Executives on Trial: Criminal Convictions of Stewart, Bacanovic Aid SEC’s Civil Case,
WALL ST. J., Mar. 8, 2004, at C1, available at 2004 WL-WSJ 56922183.

35

RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 154 (1981) (“A party bears the risk of
mistake when . . . he is aware, at the time the contract is made, that he has only limited
knowledge with respect to the facts to which the mistake relates but treats his limited
knowledge as sufficient . . . .”).
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gone wrong with the process of obtaining assent to the contract, and substantive
unconscionability, in which the terms themselves are so harsh and overreaching that no
one would voluntarily enter into the contract.36
The students must analyze the situation using both procedural and substantive
unconscionability doctrines. Although many times the students only want to talk about
the price differential, I remind them that the courts normally do not analyze the adequacy
of consideration and that even a peppercorn will normally suffice.37 Rather, to render a
contract unconscionable, there must be something more than just the presence of an
“unfair” bargain. In addition, there must be an element of surprise, misrepresentation, or
mistake, along with the seemingly one-sided deal.38 However, the unconscionability
doctrine has been narrowly construed by many courts.39 Of course the students, with
perfect hindsight, can say that they would never enter such a contract. I use this as an
opportunity to emphasize the difference between ex post and ex ante decisionmaking.
C. Fraud, Misrepresentation, and Conditions
Larson allegedly made a statement to Williams that the fossil from Williams’ land
would remain in Hill City, South Dakota, housed in the Black Hills Institute’s museum.40
I present a hypothetical to the students in which the Black Hills Institute representatives
make this assertion, but then change their minds and decide to sell it after excavating the
skeleton and realizing, with the extent it is complete, that it would be worth millions at
auction.
I ask the class whether such a “change” in the facts would make any difference in
terms of the validity of the contract with Williams. Although some students initially said
“no,” many others thought that it might make a difference. This group of students said
that if the Hill City location was important to Williams when he assented, and then the
location changed, it might be important enough to make a difference in whether the
contract was enforceable. I use this opportunity to go over the idea of a “material”
misrepresentation, and what would be considered important or not important in terms of
inducing someone to assent.
36

See Paul Bennett Marrow, Crafting a Remedy for the Naughtiness of Procedural
Unconscionability, 34 CUMB. L. REV. 11, 17 (2003-04) (distinguishing between
procedural and substantive unconscionability and proposing a new type of tort action,
Consequential Procedural Unconscionability, for the victims of unconscionable
contracts).
37

E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH, CONTRACTS § 2.11 (2d ed. 1998) (“As a general rule, the
adequacy of consideration is not a proper subject for judicial scrutiny.”) (citation
omitted).
38

See Williams v. Walker-Thomas Furniture Co., 350 F.2d 445, 449-50 (D.C. Cir. 1965).

39

See, e.g. Wille v. Southwestern Bell Tel. Co., 549 P.2d 903 (Kan. 1976).

40

CURSE OF T. REX (Nova original television broadcast, Feb. 25, 1997).
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I then change the hypothetical to focus on Larson’s state of mind. In one version of
the facts, Larson knows the value of the T-Rex and has already decided that he will move
the T-Rex from Hill City and auction it at the time that he gives Williams the $5,000
check. In the other version of the facts, he has not yet decided what to do with the T-Rex.
I then ask the class whether the state of mind matters. Inevitably, the class agrees that the
state of mind does matter, and that helps them to distinguish between fraud and
misrepresentation. It also helps them understand the concept of scienter.
The hypothetical also presents a good opportunity to work on conditions. The
proposition that the T-Rex stays in Hill City could be thought of as a condition to the
contract. Then I ask the students to identify what type of condition it is, and they usually
come up with the right answer, that it is a condition subsequent. The movement of the
dinosaur from Hill City (an event that happens after the making of the contract) would
prevent the operation of the contract – just as a true condition subsequent would.
Although I articulate to the students the difference between conditions precedent and
conditions subsequent, i.e., the timing, and the impact of the distinction, i.e., the burden
of proof,41 I also inform the students that Restatement (Second) of Contracts has done
away with this distinction and true conditions subsequent are rare.42 Nevertheless, I
inform the class that in some jurisdictions the distinction and differential procedural
treatment endure, and the doctrine retains its vitality at least for the purpose of the bar
examination.
D. Economic Duress
Although the doctrine of duress has often been limited to physical circumstances that
wrongfully induce a party to enter a contract, i.e., the paradigmatic “gun to the head” that
forces a party to agree, there is also a subset of duress cases that depends on economic
pressure.43 As I explain to my students, however, many times the parties are contracting
for necessities, such as food, shelter, and medical care.44 However, these situations are
not normally viewed as instances of economic duress, even though one party may
desperately “need” the good or service that the seller is providing.
41

With a condition precedent, the burden of proof is on the plaintiff, whereas with a
condition subsequent the burden of proof is with the defendant.

42

Restatement (Second) Contracts § 224 (1981). I give the class a number of examples
of a condition subsequent, but the best example I have come across was the example
Professor Einer Elhauge gave to my first-year contracts class, based on the facts of Gray
v. Gardner. The case involved a buyer in Nantucket harbor, who made a contract with a
captain to purchase his cargo of whale oil, unless another ship arrived in the harbor
within the next week. Gray v. Gardner, 17 Mass. 188 (1821).

43

FARNSWORTH, supra note 36, at §§ 4.16-.17.

44

Joseph W. Singer, No Right to Exclude: Public Accommodations and Private Property,
90 NW. U. L. REV. 1283 (1996) (explaining original justification for public
accommodations law was access to such necessities while traveling).
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Initially it is tempting for students to look to economic duress as a doctrine that would
serve as a defense to Maurice Williams’s performance of the contract. That is because
the Nova video tells them that the Pine Ridge Indian Reservation, within a hundred miles
of Hill City, is one of the most economically deprived areas of the United States.45 With
unemployment hovering above 70%, residents of the reservation are prone to many of the
ills associated with poverty: domestic violence, substance abuse, and disease.46 Surely, if
anyone is entitled to a defense based on economic necessity, it would be a Pine Ridge
resident.
However, there are problems with the economic duress defense, starting with the
point that the doctrine is a narrow one.47 Generally, individuals are not allowed to escape
their contractual obligations merely because their own economic circumstances were dire
at the time they entered the contract.48 In addition, when economic duress is viewed as a
valid defense, it is usually because the party who is attempting to enforce the contract had
a hand in creating the underlying economic necessity that drove the other party into the
contract. In that sense, economic duress involves more of a type of “opportunism” or
excessive gouging49 of the other party rather than one party’s dire poverty.
Applying the doctrine of economic duress, it becomes evident that, while a
possibility, it is probably not the best choice. Although Williams lived on the reservation
in an economically depressed area, there are no facts to suggest that the fossil hunters
helped to create the poor conditions only to turn around and exploit them.50 Rather, a
large part of the poverty appears to be the result of years of misguided governmental
45

As described by the Wall Street Journal, “[t]he community has the shortest life
expectancy of anywhere in the Western Hemisphere outside Haiti: 48 years old for men
and 52 for women . . . . Nearly half the tribe’s population is destitute. The
unemployment rate is about 75%. There is no bank, no motel, no movie theater.”
Jonathan Eig, Grave Success: Where Poverty, Death Walk Hand in Hand, A Profitable
Exception, WALL ST. J., Mar. 5, 2002, at A1, available at 2002 WL-WSJ 3387689. The
plight of the Pine Ridge Indian Reservation is also described in books too numerous to
mention. See, e.g., MARY CROW DOG, LAKOTA WOMAN (1991) (detailing personal
experiences of Native American woman); IAN FRAZIER, ON THE REZ (2001) (describing
author’s observations of the Pine Ridge reservation).
46

See Eig, supra note 45.

47

FARNSWORTH, supra note 36, at § 4.16 (describing strict test for duress).

48

Hackley v. Headley, 8 N.W. 511, 514 (Mich. 1881).

49

I often give my students examples of business practices and ask them to articulate the
difference between shrewd business tactics (i.e., examples of good capitalism) versus
instances where they think one party is taking an unfair advantage of the other.
Unsurprisingly, I get many different responses when I try to get them to articulate
precisely where the differences lie.

50

That is, except in the most general way that whites remain the beneficiaries of
government policies that have exploited Native Americans for their lands.
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policies and agency mismanagement, and the residents’ reactions to such policies. Under
these circumstances, I explain to the students that any attempt to assert a defense of
economic duress will likely fail.
E. Undue Influence
Yet another possible defense that a lawyer for Williams could deploy would be the
doctrine of undue influence. Doctrinally, undue influence might be seen as a
combination of duress, unequal bargaining power, and reduced capacity.51 There is a
multi-factor test that the courts use to determine whether a contract is void on the grounds
of undue influence.52 These factors include the number of individuals attempting to
persuade the contracting party, extreme high pressure sales tactics, coercive timing, and
the like.53
I have the students think about the facts, and they mostly conclude that, although we
do not know very much about the process of contract formation between Williams and
Black Hills, it likely was not a case of undue influence. However, upon changing the
hypothetical around to include a knock on the door in the middle of the night, with ten
fossil hunters from the Black Hills present on the doorstep, who all demand that Williams
assent, the class reaches a different conclusion.
F. Ability to Sell
The actual court case, however, was decided not on the basis of a contract defense,
but rather on a fundamental property and contract law principle: in general,54 you cannot
sell what you do not own.55 In general, if one owns subject to a restriction, the transferee
takes subject to that restriction as well.56
51

BARNETT, supra note 15, at 996.

52

Odorizzi v. Bloomfield Sch. Dist., 246 Cal. App. 2d 123, 131-33 (1966).

53

Id. at 133.

54

The reason I add the caveat “in general” is that a colleague rightly pointed out that 1)
the concept of adverse possession carries with it some ownership rights, see e.g., Jeffrey
Evans Stake, The Uneasy Case for Adverse Possession, 89 Geo. L. J. 2419 (2001); 2)
people sell or gift property they do not own, often with the intent of acquiring the
property later, such as in after-acquired title or deed by estoppel, see e.g., 23 AM. JUR. 2D
Deeds § 277 (2002); 3) stock puts and calls, see e.g., Jerry W. Markham & Rita McCloy
Stephanz, The Stock Market Crash of 1987, 76 GEO L.J. 1993, 2006 n.71 (1988)
(discussing options); and 4) a finder can sell something and the purchaser gets the right to
keep it unless the true owner appears, see e.g., 1 AM. JUR. 2D Abandoned, Lost, and
Unclaimed Property § 23 (1994).
55

See, e.g., Moore & Co. v. Robinson, 62 Ala. 537, 543 (1878) ("Mr. Benjamin, in his
excellent book on sales of personal property, says: 'In general, no man can sell goods, and
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Here, Williams did not own the “land,” e.g. the dinosaur, in fee simple. Rather, the
federal government held the land in trust for Williams.57 According to the terms of the
trust, alienation could only take place with the permission of the government.58 Thus,
Williams could not sell the dinosaur when he had no right to alienate it. From a contract
perspective, one could also say that the requirement of government permission was a
condition precedent to the sale, albeit one that neither party was aware of at the time of
the contract.
Ultimately, in deciding the case, the court bypassed, for the most part, common law
contract defenses. But it certainly makes for an interesting classroom discussion, and one
that will test students’ knowledge of the contract defenses materials.
IV. IMPLICATIONS FOR TEACHING CONTRACT DEFENSES: LAW TEACHING BEYOND THE
SOCRATIC METHOD
The teaching module described above 1) uses technology; 2) uses a problem-based
approach; and 3) promotes active learning.59 This is purposeful and represents my belief
that a law professor can - and should - teach a basic first year course with techniques that
go beyond the Socratic method.60
convey a valid title to them, unless he be the owner, or lawfully represent the owner.
Nemo dat, quod non habit.'--Benj. on Sales, § 6."); Rocky Mountain Fuel Co. v. George
N. Sparling Coal Co., 143 P. 815, 818 (Colo. Ct. App. 1914) (“The general rule of law is
that a purchaser of merchandise takes only such title as his seller has and is authorized to
transfer; that he acquires precisely the interest which the seller owns, and no other or
greater."); Barlow v. Stevenson, 2000 Del. C.P. LEXIS 62, *4 (Del. Ct. Common Pleas
July 19, 2000); Inmi-Etti v. Aluisi, 492 A.2d 917, 920-922 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1985)
(holding that “purchaser can take only those rights which his transferor has in the subject
goods.”).
56

Id.

57

Black Hills Inst. of Geological Research v. S.D. Sch. of Mines & Tech., 12 F.3d 737, at
742-43 (8th Cir. 1993).
58

See id. at 742.

59

Essentially, in designing the course module, I drew on the literature promoting
excellence in law school classroom teaching, including GERALD F. HESS & STEVEN I.
FRIEDLAND, TECHNIQUES FOR TEACHING LAW (1999); Alexander J. Bolla, Jr., Reflections
from the Total Quality Management Casefile in Legal Education, 43 EMORY L.J. 541
(1994); Gerald F. Hess, Listening to our Students: Obstructing and Enhancing Learning
in Law School, 31 U.S.F. L. REV. 941 (1997).
60

Indeed, some commentators have already been busy describing the demise of the
Socratic method. See Orin S. Kerr, The Decline of the Socratic Method at Harvard, 78
NEB. L. REV. 113 (1999).
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In the past two decades, the Socratic method has come under attack from numerous
commentators, although the method certainly also has its defenders.61 A sampling of the
recent scholarship reveals a growing uneasiness about the pedagogical value of the
method. In the immortal words of Grant Gilmore, the Socratic method too often results
in a classroom where “never is heard an encouraging word and the thoughts remain
cloudy all day.”62 Deborah Rhode documents many similar problems, and extensively
lists the shortcomings of the Socratic method. 63 Her critique focuses on the fact that the
Socratic method teaches law students to divorce legal thought from the interpersonal
ways of thinking that most people have before attending law school, which are of vital
importance when dealing with clients in the real world.64
At the same time, recent critiques have also articulated the psychological harms that
prey on students as a result of the Socratic method.65 Feminists have argued that the
Socratic method tends to have a disparate impact on female law students, preventing
women from reaching their full potential in the classroom.66 Critical race theorists use
61

See, e.g. James R. Beattie, Jr., Socratic Ignorance: Once More Into the Cave, 105 W.
VA. L. REV. 471 (2003) (setting out the criticisms of the Socratic method, including
humiliation of students, hiding the ball, creating combative students, and silencing
women and minorities, yet then inexplicably concluding that the Socratic method is
valuable); Phillip E. Areeda, The Socratic Method, 109 HARV. L. REV. 911 (1996)
(providing outline of talk explaining proper use of Socratic Method).
62

Grant Gilmore, What Is a Law School?, 15 CONN. L. REV. 1, 1 (1982).

63

Deborah L. Rhode, Missing Questions: Feminist Perspectives on Legal Education, 45
STAN. L. REV. 1547, 1558-59 (1993).
64

Id. at 1559.

65

For discussion of the effect of the Socratic method on the physiological and
psychological health and well-being of law students see Suzanne C. Sergerstrom,
Perceptions of Stress and Control in the First Semester of Law School, 32 WILLAMETTE
L. REV. 593, 594 (1996) (documenting, among law students subjected to the Socratic
Method, “extreme self-punishing attitudes, obsessive self-doubt, apathy, withdrawal from
normal activities, fear, apprehension, a sense of impending doom, and panic attacks.”);
Phyllis W. Beck & David Burns, Anxiety and Depression in Law Students: Cognitive
Intervention, 30 J. LEGAL EDUC. 270, 285-86 (1980); Julie E. Buchwald, Confronting a
Hazard: Do Eating Disorders Plague Women in the Legal Profession?, 9 S. CAL. REV. L.
& WOMEN’S STUD. 101, 117-19 (1999); James B. Taylor, Law School Stress and the
“Déformation Professionelle”, 27 J. LEGAL EDUC. 251, 253-54 (1975); Andrew S.
Watson, The Quest for Professional Competence: Psychological Aspects of Legal
Education, 37 U. CIN. L. REV. 93, 121-22 (1968).
66

See, e.g,. id., LANI GUINIER ET AL., BECOMING GENTLEMEN: WOMEN, LAW SCHOOL,
AND INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE (1997); Jennifer Gerarda Brown, “To Give Them
Countenance”: The Case for a Women’s Law School, 22 HARV. WOMEN’S L.J. 1, 11-13
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much the same argument, persuasively stating that the Socratic method also silences
minority students.67 And then there are the voices of the students, who inevitably discuss
the incredible anxiety and pressure that the Socratic Method imposes.68
The point here is that a professor has a number of different tools at his or her disposal,
and the lesson that I have described above attempts to employ a number of different
techniques. The T-Rex Sue module uses technology, problem-based learning, and even
humor69 to get its point across. And at the end of the day, the students have learned
contract defenses, articulated arguments, and have evolved as legal thinkers.

(1999); David D. Garner, Socratic Misogyny? Analyzing Feminist Criticisms of Socratic
Teaching in Legal Education, 2000 BYU. L. REV. 1597 (2000).
67

See Ruta K. Stropus, Mend It, Bend It, and Extend It: The Fate of Traditional Law
School Methodolody in the 21st Century, 27 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 449, 462-65 (1996).

68

See, e.g. Paula Garber, “Just Trying to be Human in this Place”: The Legal Education
of Twenty Women, 10 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 165, 201-03 (1998).

69

John J. Capowski, Evidence and the One-Liner: A Beginning Evidence Professor’s
Exploration of the Use of Humor in the Law School Classroom, 35 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 877
(2003) (exploring fairly obvious idea that humor can help students relax and make the
doctrine more interesting and memorable).
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